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IMPLICITLY DEFINABLE GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS
FREDRIK ENGSTRM
Abstract. We give a new elementary proof of the main theorem of
[Fef12]: Quantifiers implicitly definable in pure second-order logic equipped
with Henkin semantics implies are (explicitly) definable in first-order
logic.
Dear Chris,
You have recently, together with Jrgen Sjgren in [BS11, BS13], proposed
that concepts should be considered mathematical iff they have a unique
explication (in the sense of Carnap). In this short paper I will discuss a
somewhat similar idea: Symbols (or operations) should be considered logical
iff they can be defined uniquely by inference rules. This idea can be traced
back at least to Belnap’s response [Bel62] to Prior’s argument in his famous
Tonk paper [Pri60]; but let us start from the beginning.
Logic considers the form, or to be more precise, the logical form, of sen-
tences and arguments. To determine this form we need to distinguish the
logical constants from the other symbols; we need to characterize the logical
constants, answering the fundamental question:
Which symbols should be considered logical?
For example, what is the reason for us think of ∀ and ∧ as logical but not
P and c in the formula ∀x(P (x) ∨ x = c)?
Several answers to this questions has been proposed; we shall concentrate
on a proof theoretic idea (or rather a model theoretic take on the proof
theoretic idea): Symbols that can be defined by inference rules are logical.
Belnap, in [Bel62], proposed that “defined” should be understood as being
governed by conservative inference rules that define the symbol uniquely.
Regarding uniqueness he writes:
It seems rather odd to say we have defined plonk unless we
can show that A-plonk-B is a function of A and B, i.e., given
A and B, there is only one proposition A-plonk-B.
A possible, and natural, interpretation of what it means for a symbol Q to
be uniquely definable is the following: If Q′ is another symbol governed by
the same inference rules as Q, then ϕ ⊢ ϕ′; where Q′ is not mentioned in ϕ
and ϕ′ is like ϕ but with all occurrences of Q replaced by Q′.
In [Fef12] Feferman argues for a model theoretic take on this proof theo-
retic explanation of logicality. In model theoretic terms, conservativity can
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be understood as existence of a sound interpretation of the symbol1 and the
uniqueness can be understood as uniqueness of that interpretation. Thus,
the proof theoretic notion of unique definability corresponds, in some sense,
to the model theoretic notion of implicit definability.
In this short paper I will give a new elementary proof of the main result
of Feferman in [Fef12] that implicitly definable quantifiers (in a second-
order language) are exactly the (explicitly) definable ones (in a first-order
language). We end with some open questions and remarks.
Technical preliminaries
Throughout the paper M will denote the domain of a model M.
We will focus on quantifier symbols, i.e., symbols that bind variables.
Their model theoretic interpretations are generalized quantifiers:
Definition ([Lin66]). A generalized quantifier Q of type 〈n1, n2, . . . , nk〉 is
a (class) function mapping sets to sets such that
QM = Q(M) ⊆ P(M
n1)× P(Mn2)× . . .× P(Mnk).
The syntax and semantics of the extension of first-order logic with a
quantifier symbol Q of type 〈n1, n2, . . . , nk〉, L(Q), can be exemplified by
the formula
Qx¯1, x¯2, . . . , x¯k(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕk)
together with the truth condition corresponding to an interpretation Q of
the symbol Q:
M,s |= Qx¯1, . . . , x¯k(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk) iff (Jx¯1|ϕ1K
M,s, . . . , Jx¯k|ϕkK
M,s) ∈ QM ,
where Jy¯|ϕKM,s = { a¯ ∈M l | M, s[a¯/y¯] |= ϕ }, and l is the length of the tuple
y¯.
The quantifiers of first-order logic, ∀ and ∃ are examples of generalized
quantifiers:
• ∀M = {M }
• ∃M = {A ⊆M | A 6= ∅ }
Other examples of generalized quantifiers include the following cardinality
quantifiers:
• (Q0)M = {A ⊆M | |A| ≥ ℵ0 }, and in general
• (Qα)M = {A ⊆M | |A| ≥ ℵα },
• IM = { 〈A,B〉 | A,B ⊆M, |A| = |B| }
Second-order implicit definitions. If we agree that the model theoretic
notion of implicit definability in some way is the right model theoretic trans-
lation of Belnap’s proof theoretic notion of unique definability, then we need
to know what it means for a generalized quantifier to be implicitly defin-
able. To answer that we are going to introduce a very basic second-order
language:
The second-order language L2 is pure second-order logic with two kinds
of variables:
1This is not a perfect translation; even when given a sound and complete proof system,
model theoretic conservativity (i.e., the existence of a sound interpretation) is strictly
stronger than proof theoretic conservativity.
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• Individual variables: x, y, z, . . ., and
• Predicate variables (including 0-ary) P,P1, P2 . . .
The atomic formulas are predicate variables applied to individual variables,
as in P (x, y). Formulas are built from atomic formulas using ¬,∨,∧,→,∀,∃.
Observe that we may quantify using both individual variables, as in ∀y, and
predicate variables, as in ∃P .
The semantics for L2 used in [Fef12] is so-called Henkin semantics: An
L2 model consists of a set M together with subsets Predk(M) of P(M
k)
for the predicate variables to range over. We follow Feferman in that the
subsets Predk(M) may be chosen in a completely arbitrary way.
2
Example. Let the domain of M be { 1, 2 } and Pred1(M) = { ∅ }, i.e., the
unary predicates are only allowed to be interpreted as the empty set. Then
M |= ∀P ∀x¬P (x).
The language L2(Q) is L2 extended with a second-order predicate symbol
Q of some specified type 〈n1, . . . , nk〉. For example, ∀P Q(P ) is a sentence
of L2(Q), if Q is of type 〈k〉 and P is of arity k.
A model of L2(Q) consists of a model M of L2 together with an inter-
pretation of Q as a second-order predicate, i.e., a subset of Predn1(M) ×
. . . × Prednk(M). A generalized quantifier Q of type 〈n1, . . . , nk〉 defines a
second-order predicate over any L2 model M:
QM = QM ∩
(
Predn1(M) × . . . × Prednk(M)
)
.
Definition. A sentence σ of L2(Q) implicitly defines a generalized quanti-
fier Q if, for every L2 model M, the only second-order predicate over M
satisfying σ is QM.
Compare this with the notion of (explicit) definability:
Definition. A formula σ(P1, . . . , Pk) of L2 (explicitly) defines a generalized
quantifier Q if for every L2 modelM, and every R1 ∈ Predn1(M), . . . , Rk ∈
Prednk(M):
(M, R1, . . . , Rk) |= σ(P1, . . . , Pk) iff 〈R1, . . . , Rk〉 ∈ QM.
We can now state and prove a slightly weaker form of the main result of
[Fef12]:
Lemma. All generalized quantifiers of type 〈n1, . . . , nk〉, where ni 6= nj,
i 6= j, implicitly definable in L2(Q) are definable in first-order logic.
Proof. Let us give the full proof for the case where k = 1 and n1 = 1, i.e.,
where Q is of type 〈1〉. The general result follows by the same argument.
Assume Q is implicitly definable in L2 by the formula θ, where θ is written
in prenex normal form. For any A ⊆ M let MA be the model of L2 in
which the first-order variables range over the set M , the second-order unary
variables range over the singleton set {A }, and the polyadic second-order
variables range over ∅.
2Observe that in the rather restricted language of L2, there are no first-order formulas
(a formula without second-order quantifiers) without free predicate variables. Thus, a
very restricted form of comprehension holds in all models for trivial reasons.
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Let A ⊆ M be such that A ∈ QM (if there are no such M and A then
Q is first-order definable). Since θ implicitly defines Q we know that QM ∩
Pred1(MA) = {A } satisfies θ, but ∅ does not. We may conclude that there
cannot be any polyadic variables occurring in θ since then θ would be true
or false (only depending on the first polyadic quantifier being existential or
universal) in MA regardless of how Q is interpreted.
Let ϕ be the first-order formula we get by removing the second-order
prefix from θ and replacing all second-order variables by the single unary
predicate symbol P . We also replace all occurrences of Q(P ) by some true
sentence, for example ∃xPx ∨ ¬∃xPx.
It should be clear that for any A ⊆M ,
(M,A) |= ϕ iff (MA, {A }) |= θ.
Note that (MA,X) is to be interpreted as the model MA in which X is the
interpretation of the quantifier symbol (second-order predicate symbol) Q.
We know that θ implicitly defines Q, meaning that (MA, {A }) |= θ iff
{A } = QM ∩MA. Clearly {A } = QM ∩MA iff A ∈ QM .
Thus, for any A ⊆M ,
(M,A) |= ϕ iff A ∈ QM .
The first-order sentence ϕ (explicitly) defines Q. 
An easy observation now gives us the full result:
Theorem ([Fef12]). All generalized quantifiers implicitly definable in L2(Q)
are definable in first-order logic.
Proof. Given a quantifier of type 〈n1, . . . , nk〉 we define Q
+l of type
〈n1, . . . , nl−1, nl + 1, nl+1, . . . , nk〉
as follows:
(Q+l)M = { 〈R1, . . . , Rl−1, Rl ×M,Rl+1, . . . , Rk | 〈R1, . . . , Rk〉 ∈ QM } .
It should be clear that Q+l is implicitly definable in L2 if Q is, and that Q
is definable in first-order logic if Q+l is. The theorem then follows directly
from the lemma. 
Conclusion and Discussion
The proof of the theorem rests on the simple idea that this general version
of Henkin semantics does not allow second-order quantification to be used in
a substantial way, not because of deep results but of completely elementary
reasons. I believe the above argument suggests that the specific choice of
Henkin semantics for L2 is plainly wrong. Maybe a more natural choice
would be to include some comprehension axioms for the Henkin semantics:
Only consider models M satisfying
∀R¯∃P ∀x¯
(
ϕ(x¯, R¯)↔ P (x¯)
)
,
where ϕ is any formula of L2. This leads us to a stronger notion of implicit
definability and the following open question:
Question. Which quantifiers are implicitly definable in L2 equipped with
this stronger form of Henkin semantics?
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Regardless of the choice of semantics to use there is clearly something
funny with thinking of arbitrarily complicated formulas of L2 as somehow
corresponding to inference rules. Instead, to find the correct model theoretic
take on Belnap’s idea to characterize logicality in terms of unique definabil-
ity, we need to analyze the concept of an inference rule to see what the right
logic to express such rules is. A first attempt in this direction might be the
observation that many inference rules can be formalized by a Π11 formula.
This leads us directly to the following question:
Question. Which quantifiers are implicitly definable in full second-order
logic (i.e., second-order logic with standard semantics) with a Π11 sentence?
Clearly, any first-order definable quantifier is implicitly definable with a
Π11 sentence. In fact, any ∆
1
1 definable quantifier is.
Question. Are there ∆11 definable quantifiers that are not first-order defin-
able?
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